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Deliberate Indifference: Judicial Tolerance
of Racial Bias in Criminal Justice
Bryan A. Stevenson*
Ruth E. Fnedman"
On April 22, 1987, a majority of the United States Supreme Court
announced a startling and deeply disturbing opinion about race and the
administration of criminal justice in the United States. Presented with
overwhelming statistical evidence of racial bias in Georgia's use of the death
penalty,I the Court ruled in McCleskey v Kemp2 that race-based sentencing
disparities for similarly situated defendants are "an inevitable part of our
criminal justice system."3 After expressing fear that responding to racial
bias in death penalty cases might necessarily require confronting racial bias
in other criminal cases,4 the Court concluded that the Constitution does not
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School; M.P.P., John F Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University; B.A., Eastern
College.
** Staff Attorney, Alabama Capital Representation Resource Center and Southern
Center for Human Rights; J.D., Yale Law School; A.B., Harvard University
1. The raw data from a study of murder cases in Georgia by Professor David Baldus
of the University of Iowa constituted the statistical evidence in the case. See DAVID C.
BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 306-93 (1990). The Baldus
study revealed that an accused is 8.3 times more likely to receive the death penalty for crimes
committed against whites than crimes committed against blacks. Id. at 314. If the accused
is black, he or she is 21 times more likely to be sentenced to death if the victim is white, as
opposed to black. See id. at 315 (Table 50). Even after controlling for the effects of other
variables influencing sentencing decisions in Georgia, a person accused of murdering
someone white is 4.3 times more likely to be sentenced to death than someone accused of
murdering a black person. Id. at 316.
2. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
3. McCleskey v Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 312 (1987).
4. The majority reasoned that "if we accepted McCleskey's claim that racial bias has
impermissibly tainted the capital sentencing decision, we could soon be faced with similar
claims as to other types of penalty " Id. at 315-16. In his dissent, Justice Brennan observed
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place such "totally unrealistic conditions" on the use of capital punishment
or the admnistration of criminal justice.5
Judicial Tolerance of Racial Bias
It seems unimaginable that the Supreme Court, an institution vested
with the responsibility to achieve "equal justice under the law" for all
Americans, could issue an opinion that accepted the inevitability of racial
bias in an area as serious and final as capital punishment. However, it is
precisely this acceptance of bias and the tolerance of racial discrimination
that has come to define America's criminal justice system. The last thirty
years have seen remarkable changes in America's relationship with people
of color. The civil rights movement has ushered in significant developments
in antidiscrimination law and has profoundly affected the status of African
Americans. While enormous barriers still exist for many racial minorities,
tremendous progress has been made in voting rights,6 housing,7 employ-
ment,8 public accommodations, 9 and education" for African Americans and
other historically disenfranchised people.
The impact of the civil rights movement is, however, noticeably
missing from the realm of criminal justice. It is difficult to identify much
evolution on the part of courts, legislators, or policymakers in appreciating
the debilitating injustice that invidious racial bias represents in the adminis-
tration of legal process. In fact, it is hard to find an area of public
administration in which racial bias and discrimination is more tolerated and
accepted.
that "such a statement seems to suggest a fear of too much justice." Id. at 339.
5. Id. at 319 (quoting Gregg v Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 n.50 (1976)).
6. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973p (1988)).
7 See Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. VIII, 82 Stat. 81 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3614(a) (1988)).
8. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 253 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988)).
9. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. II, 78 Stat. 243 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000a-6 (1988)); Heart of Atlanta Motel v United States,
379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
10. See Brown v Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Capital Punishment: Death is Not Different
As attorneys representing capital defendants and death row prisoners
in the deep South, we see the pervasive presence of racial bias in painfully
obvious ways in case after case. The death penalty is the criminal justice
system's most serious and most notorious punishment." How capital
punishment is imposed reveals a great deal about the entire criminal justice
system.
In 1972, the Supreme Court acknowledged severe problems in the
administration of capital punishment, including its inexorable link with racial
bias, and suspended use of the death penalty 12 However, some twenty-two
years later, the death penalty remains a punishment that is applied dispropor-
tionately to African Americans and criminal defendants accused of killing
people who are white. Since 1976, when the Supreme Court upheld new
death penalty statutes, black men have accounted for 71 % of the people
executed in Georgia, 75% of those executed in Mississippi, and 70% of
those executed in Alabama."3 Even congressional studies have found that
II. The Supreme Court has recognized "that the penalty of death is qualitatively
different from a sentence of imprisonment" and that there is a heightened need for reliability
in the proceedings and decisionmaking that surround a capital case. Woodson v North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
12. Furman v Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). When the Supreme Court struck down
Georgia's capital punishment statute, it observed that of the 455 persons sentenced to death
for rape in this country since the Justice Department started keeping statistics in 1930, 405
were black. Id. at 364 (Marshall, J., concurring).
13. See NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, DEATH Row U.S.A. (forthcoming Summer
1994). While the statistics cited above reflect what is happening in the deep South, it would
be a mistake to conclude that the evidence of racial bias in the administration of the death
penalty is limited to this region. Illinois has a death row population that is 61% black,
Pennsylvania's death row is 59% black, and Maryland's death row is 79% black. See id.
Even the administration of the federal death penalty that Congress approved in 1988 has not
avoided the appearance of racial bias. The 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act provided for the death
penalty for drug kingpins convicted of murder. 21 U.S.C. §§ 848(e)-(q) (1988). Every
prosecution under this statute must be authorized by the Attorney General of the United
States. To date, 78% of the defendants selected for prosecution have been African
Americans. STAFF OF HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM., SUBCOMM. ON CIV AND CONST. RIGHTS,
103D CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON RACIAL DISPARITIES IN FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY
PROSECUTIONS 2 (Comm. Print 1994). No one in law enforcement has suggested that three-
fourths of the drug kingpins in America are black. These statistics, which reflect the
decisionmaking of three different White House administrations, are deeply disturbing.
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racial bias remains a dominant feature of America's use of the death
penalty 14
As disturbing as are the statistics and data that summarize racial bias,
overt racial discrimination can also be seen in individual cases. What
remains remarkable about race and criminal justice is not that bias and
discrimination exist, but that they plainly are tolerated. When Florida
prosecuted Anthony Ray Peek, an African American, for capital murder, the
white judge who presided over the trial demonstrated prejudgments about
Peek's guilt, improperly admitted evidence, and after successfully engineer-
ing a conviction for capital murder, stated from the bench: "Since the nigger
mom and dad are here anyway, why don't we go ahead and do the penalty
phase today instead of having to subpoena them back at cost to the state. 
" 5
Mr. Peek was sentenced to death.
On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court reviewed the issue of racial bias
stemming from the judge's remarks and simply admonished trial judges to
be careful to "convey the image of impartiality "16 While the judge's
comments reflect the kind of racial bias that would have cost sportscasters
or news commentators their jobs, a trial judge charged with making the
ultimate decision between life and death continues to preside over capital
cases and sentence black defendants with impunity Interestingly, Mr.
Peek's conviction was overturned on other grounds, and he was later retried
before a different judge and found innocent of all charges.
In 1989, Alabama executed Herbert Richardson, a Vietnam War
veteran suffering from post traumatic stress disorder who returned home
after experiencing a mental breakdown during combat duty in Vietnam. Mr.
Richardson's death sentence came after the prosecutor urged the sentencing
14. A 1990 study by the General Accounting Office that reviewed all studies of capital
sentencing since resumption of the death penalty in 1976 concluded that significant evidence
demonstrating bias in favor of the death penalty in white victim cases exists. U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERN OF
RACIAL DISPARITIES 5 (1990).
15. Peek v Florida, 488 So. 2d 52, 56 (Fla. 1986). The penalty phase is the
proceeding at which punishment is determined in a capital case. It follows a conviction at the
first phase and is like a second trial in that separate witnesses, arguments, and instructions
are required.
16. Id. at 56.
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judge to impose the death penalty in part because of Mr. Richardson's
alleged association with "the Black Muslim organization."' 7
Wilburn Dobbs remains on Georgia's death row even though his trial
was undermined by racial bias on the part of virtually every decisionmaker
who controlled his fate. Mr. Dobbs was tried in Walker County before a
judge who as a member of the Georgia legislature had consistently voted in
support of racial segregation. During the trial, the judge and the defense
lawyer referred to Mr. Dobbs as "colored" and "colored boy," while the
prosecutor called him by his first name.' 8 Interviews with members of the
all-white jury that convicted and sentenced Mr. Dobbs to death revealed that
some jurors believed that the Ku Klux Klan did good things for the
community and that African Americans were genetically predisposed to
commit violent crimes.' 9 Even Mr. Dobbs' defense attorney maintained
views that could fairly be characterized as unashamedly racist.' After
reviewing the evidence of racial bias presented by Mr. Dobbs, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that he was not entitled
to relief despite the racist conduct of the decisionmakers who held his life in
their hands.2
17 Trial Tr. at 28, State v Richardson, CC-77-318 (Houston County Cir. Ct. 1978).
18. Dobbs v Zant, 720 F Supp. 1566, 1578 (N.D. Ga. 1989), aff'd, 963 F.2d 1403
(1 lth Cir. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 113 S. Ct. 835 (1993).
19. Id. at 1575-76.
20. The District Court made these findings concerning Dobbs' defense attorney-
Dobbs' trial attorney was outspoken about his views. He said that many
blacks are uneducated and would not make good teachers, but do make good
basketball players. He opined that blacks are less educated and less intelligent
than whites either because of their nature or because "my granddaddy had
slaves." He said that integration has led to deteriorating neighborhoods and
schools, and referred to the black community in Chattanooga as "black boy
jungle." He strongly implied that blacks have inferior morals by relating a
story about sex in a classroom. He also said that when he was young, a maid
was hired with the understanding that she would steal some items. He said
that blacks in Chattanooga are more troublesome than blacks in Walker
County [Georgia].
Id. at 1577
21. Dobbsv Zant, 963 F.2d 1403,1412 (1lthCir. 1991), rev'don other grounds, 113
S. Ct. 835 (1993).
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These examples of overt and gross racial bias are not isolated
incidents, but very much reflect the character of criminal justice in America.
Sadly, volumes could be written that document incident after incident in
which racial bias has tainted and undermined the administration of criminal
justice. While a handful of defense attorneys and civil rights groups
continue to complain about a lack of progress in confronting racism in the
criminal justice system, little effort has been made to respond to this
enormous problem. '  Many Americans, including elected officials,
undoubtedly find comfort in the mistaken belief that because only "bad
people"-those criminals whom we fear and despise-are at risk in the
criminal justice system, the presence of racial discrimination is somehow
tolerable. This view is terribly misguided. An honest and just determination
of who is bad and who is not, who is guilty and who is not, can be made
only when the legal process operates fairly and without racial bias. Racial
bias within the legal system is not just an issue affecting how guilty people
are treated in courtrooms across America, but rather one that implicates the
moral authority of the law and the promise of equal justice. There is a clear
relationship between race and the admimstration of criminal justice and race
relations in this country The presence of racial bias in the justice system is
central to the concerns of people of color precisely because our society
defines itself by a commitment to law and fairness. To the extent that this
commitment is compromised or even abandoned in the context of administer-
ing criminal law, African Americans are given every reason to view
themselves as excluded from the system that dispenses justice.
That exclusion is manifest in a myriad of ways extending far beyond
the treatment of individual defendants. For example, while juries are
considered to be the ultimate link between the legal process and society at
large, black Americans continue to be barred from serving on them. This
is due to the fact that state officials regularly use their power to eliminate
people of color who are summoned to and qualified for jury service. They
22. There has been an effort in Congress to create a legislative remedy to the kind of
evidence of racial bias presented in McCleskey. The proposed Racial Justice Act has been
introduced in Congress but has, to date, failed to pass. See Angela Dorn et al., Too Much
Justice: A Legislative Response to McCleskey v Kemp, 24 HARV C.R.-C.L. L. REv 437,
438 (1989); Ronald J. Tabak, Is Racism Irrelevant? Or Should the Fairness in Death
Sentencing Act Be Enacted to Substantially Diminish Racial Discrimination in Capital
Sentencing?, 18 N.Y.U. REV L. & SOC. CHANGE 777 (1990).
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acomplish this largely by relying on their discretionary or "peremptory"' 3
jury strikes to exclude whomever they wish from participation. Time and
time again, those removed through this process are black.
While the suppression of black participation in public schools or in the
electoral process has been the subject of intense litigation for nearly half a
century, lawyers, lawmakers, and judges continue to condone the absence
of minority group members from criminal juries. Particularly lamentable is
the failure of the judiciary to prevent or even censure the wholesale removal
of people of color from juries in crmunal cases. The manner in which this
exclusion is achieved and accepted provides a stunning illustration of how
racial bias endures in the criminal courts.
Race and Peremptory Challenges
Thejudiciary's response to the deliberate exclusion of minorities from
criminal juries has been one of blind indifference. From the first meager
judicial gesture in the 1960s to the current pronouncements on jury selection,
the courts have continued to show an extraordinary willingness to tolerate
the kind of discriminatory practices that routinely are condemned outside the
criminal justice system.
The Jurisprudence of the Peremptory Challenge
The Supreme Court's first comment on the issue in the modem era
came in 1965 in Swain v Alabama.24 A black man named Robert Swain
was tried for rape and sentenced to death by an all-white jury in rural
Talladega County, Alabama.' Swain protested that the prosecutor's ability
to summarily dismiss all of the black jurors who managed to make it onto
23. Peremptory strikes are distinguished from the "for cause" strikes that are granted
to both parties when a jury is chosen. After voir dire, each side can raise "for cause"
challenges to the ability of particular jurors to serve that are based on statutory or common
law-e.g., the prospective juror is related to the defendant, is a convicted felon and,
therefore, not permitted to serve, or has a personal or financial interest in the outcome of the
case. These "cause" strikes will only be granted if based on solid legal grounds.
Peremptories, on the other hand, are strikes that have historically been used at will. Each
party is permitted to eliminate jurors for whatever reason it deems relevant until a jury of
twelve is chosen.
24. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
25. Swain v Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 203, 205 (1965).
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the vemre deprived him of his right to a fairly selected jury of his peers.26
Swain urged the Court to prevent the prosecution from accomplishing
through peremptory challenges what had been outlawed through the eradica-
tion of exclusionary legislation.'
It was not to be: the Court turned a deaf ear to Swain's evidence and
to the obvious problem he posed. It held that a defendant had no grounds
for complaint regarding the use of discretionary challenges in his case.
28
Although it was clear that the ability to use peremptory strikes in any one
case without restraint necessarily implied an ability to strike on the basis of
race-and although an all-white jury was testimony to this fact-the Court
refused to provide for any true redress. Instead, it held that discrimination
could only be proved over a sustained period of time.29 In other words, a
black defendant was not denied a fair trial if the state systematically struck
every black person summoned to hear his case, but only if it did exactly the
same thing to every other defendant it tried in that county and only then if
the defendant was able to marshal the facts to prove it. Thus, in each case
a documented history was required to show that racism might have been at
play
The Swain Court's foray into the realm of juror exclusion did nothing
to address the problem. By asking defendants to look outside their own
cases for proof of bias, the Court imposed a burden that was not only
insurmountable, but also wholly unnecessary Why must one black
defendant show that every other black defendant has also been subject to
discrimination before he can insist on a fair trial in his own cause? If a
district attorney commented on a defendant's right not to testify at trial, or
if the police broke into his home without a warrant and seized evidence, he
would not need to prove that these officials always ignored the Constitution
in order to establish the violation in his case. Nor would an employee
improperly fired from her job or a family denied a home in a new neighbor-
hood have to prove racial bias in someone else's case before getting relief.
Yet for the next two decades after Swain, the courts declined to see the
deliberate dismissal of black jurors for what it was and insulated this form
26. Id. at 210.
27 See Strauder v West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1880) (invalidating statute that
permitted only whites to serve on juries).
28. Swain, 380 U.S. at 223.
29. id. at 223-24.
JUDICIAL TOLERANCE OF RACIAL BIAS
of state-sponsored discrimination from review A different standard seemed
to reign when racial inequity in criminal justice was at issue.
Unsurprisingly, litigants could not meet the burden imposed on them:
not a single defendant prevailed on a Swain challenge in state or federal
court before the requirements were changed. 0 Consequently, the effect of
the first major case on racial bias in jury selection was to proclaim
satisfaction with the status quo. Prosecutors understood that they could
strike black jurors with impunity State trial and appellate judges knew that
the elimination of every qualified black vemre member from the capital
murder trial of a black person accused of killing a white could be sustained
within the confines of federal law Sadly, defense lawyers learned that
challenging the exclusion of black people through peremptory strikes was
futile.
Fortunately, Swain also received the universal condemnation of
scholars and practitioners who were concerned about racial bias in the
courts." They understood that if defendants were forced to put the entire
system on trial every time a single jury was chosen and if no real constraints
were placed on the selection process, criminal juries would continue to
resemble those of the eighteenth century A number of cases were brought
to the Supreme Court's attention before it agreed to reconsider the issue in
the mid 1980s.
The reluctant recognition that some change was necessary came in
1986 in Batson v Kentucky 32 Batson overruled Swain and held that a
defendant could challenge the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges in
her own case.33 In arriving at that conclusion, the Court finally began to
confront both the painful history of minority exclusion from jury service and
the fact that the Swain approach simply did not work. The Court at last con-
30. After the Supreme Court modified the standard for evaluating peremptory
challenges, some defendants whose trials were not covered by the modified standard were
able to obtain relief under Swain. See, e.g., Horton v Zant, 941 F.2d 1449, 1459 (1 Ith Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1516 (1992); Jones v Davis, 906 F.2d 552,554-55 (11th Cir.
1990).
31. See, e.g., Roger S. Kuhn, JuryDiscrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. CAL. L. REV
235 (1968); Roger C. Harper, Note, Rethinking Limitations on the Peremptory Challenge,
85 COLUM. L. REv 1357 (1985); Comment, Swain v Alabama:A Constitutional Blueprint
for the Perpetuation of the All-White Jury, 52 VA. L. REV 1157 (1966).
32. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
33. Batson v Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 92-93 (1986).
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ceded that the discretionary jury challenge could not be so sacrosanct as to
be wholly shielded from the imperatives of racial equality and set out a
procedure that enabled a defendant to attempt to prove that her jury was not
fairly chosen.
The procedure was as follows: if a black defendant could establish a
prima facie case of race discrimnation, he could compel the state to justify
its strikes with race-neutral reasons.' If the trial court deemed the reasons
acceptable, the defendant lost the challenge. If, however, the state could not
offer adequate explanations to the trier of fact, the state would be found to
have violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection guarantee, and
a new jury would have to be chosen.
To its dissenters and critics, Batson heralded an unwarranted intrusion
into the inviolable right of litigants to choose jurors in whatever manner they
desired. This appraisal was true to a certain extent: prosecutors could no
longer knock every black member off a venire list without facing even the
possibility that some protest could be lodged. It is hard to fathom, however,
why the freedom to choose with impunity should be exalted when it has been
so clearly and routinely exercised in a racially discriminatory manner.35
If high school principals, real estate brokers, and employers cannot select
students, neighbors, or workers on the basis of race, surely the "right" to
rely on race should be accorded little weight when the authority of the
courts-to say nothing of a person's life or liberty-is at stake.
Yet if Swain gave the state free rein to discriminate, Batson provided
few meaningful restrictions on discriminatory conduct. While Batson es-
tablished a mechanism for ajury selection challenge, it also left ample room
for racially biased practices to continue to flourish.3 The Court failed to
confront the enormity of the problem, both by neglecting to compel lower
courts to reject unconvincing explanations for racist practices and by failing
to make clear that the evidence of bias would at times be too strong to be
34. Id. at 97
35. Recognizing this inevitability, Justice Marshall's concurrence in Batson called for
the abolition of peremptory jury strikes. Id. at 102-08 (Marshall, J., concurring).
36. Despite the clear evidence of bias that pervaded the cases, the Court, holding that
Batson was to apply only prospectively, denied countless defendants any chance at relief. See
Griffith v Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987) (holding that Batson applied retroactively
only to cases "not yet final" when Batson was decided); Allen v Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 257-
58 (1986) (holding that Batson was not retroactively applicable to postconviction cases).
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overcome by any self-serving excuses. Even with Batson, the high Court
failed to truly stem the tide of juror exclusion based on race.
The Legacy of Swain and Batson:
Jury Selection in the 1980s and 1990s
The reality of the administration of criminal justice in the South37 is
that a black defendant can still find himself facing a jury from which the
overwhelming majority, if not all, of the prospective jurors of his race have
been excluded. This is true even in counties that have black populations
exceeding thirty or forty percent. Several factors contribute to this state of
affairs. For one, the prosecutors overwhelmingly are white. Of the sixty-
seven elected district attorneys in Alabama, one is black, and he is new to
thejob. None of Georgia's 159 counties has a black district attorney There
are also few blackjudges. It still is not uncommon for a black defendant to
find herself the only minority group member in the entire courtroom.
Many prosecutors rely on white jurors to respond to the type of tactics
they hope will convict a black defendant. A prosecutor in Chambers
County, Alabama, removed all black people from the jury both times the
case was tried; he then commented throughout the trial on the race of various
witnesses and made thinly-veiled racist arguments to the all-white panel
about why the black defendant should be executed for the killing of a white
man.3 A Georgia prosecutor took a similar approach at the original capital
trial of a black man accused of raping and killing a white woman when he
also was able to eliminate all the black venire members.39 Those usual
arguments got little play when the case was retried several years later before
a jury that included eight black members.'
37 The authors practice in Alabama and are most intimately familiar with jury
selection practices there and in neighboring southern states. The examples used in this Article
are therefore taken from our experience litigating in this area.
38. See Trial Tr. at 164, State v Jefferson, CC-81-77 (Chambers County Cir. Ct.
1984) (urging jury to impose death to "stop them" from raping and shooting and "to show
them we mean business" in burglary-murder case).
39. See Brooks v Kemp, 762 F.2d 1383, 1408-13 (11th Cir. 1985).
40. William Brooks was sentenced to death by an all-white jury in 1979 and to life in
prison by a fairly constituted jury in 1991. Compare Brooks v State, 261 S.E.2d 379, 387
(Ga. 1979) (affirming death sentence for Brooks), vacated, 762 F.2d 1383 (1 lth Cir. 1985),
vacated and remanded, 478 U.S. 1016 (1986), reinstated, 809 F.2d 700 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 483 U.S. 1010 (1987) with Brooks v State, 415 S.E.2d 903, 903 (Ga. 1992)
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In Alabama, which uses a "struck" jury system, producing an all or
predomnantly white jury takes a good deal of work. Alabama lawyers
"strike down" to a jury; that is, they work from the entire venire list and
eliminate every member until they are left with twelve names for the jury
and two alternates. Thus, to achieve the desired result, the prosecutor in
Jesse Morrison's case had to remove twenty of the twenty-one blacks who
had qualified for jury service;4" twelve of thirteen black venire members
were eliminated from Darrell Watkins' capital trial;42 Earl McGahee had
to face an all-white jury after the state removed all sixteen black venire
members;4' David Freeman was convicted and sentenced to death by an all-
white panel after the state removed nine of ten prospective black jurors;
44
and Albert Jefferson faced three all-white juries when the state used a total
of twenty-four strikes to eliminate every black person summoned for service
on each occasion.45
Prosecutors routinely use the overwhelming majority of their strikes
against African Americans even when they make up a small percentage of
the venire. In Dallas County, Alabama, the state used 77 % of its strikes
against black jurors in murder cases in a recent ten year period.' Although
its billboards boast of the "historic civil rights" movement in Selma, the
county has prevented over two-thirds of its black residents who have been
(affirming imposition of life sentence).
41. TranscriptofPostconviction Rec. at 122c, Morrison v. State, CC-78-10014 (Barbour
County Cir. Ct. 1988), aft'd, 551 So. 2d 435 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989).
42. Watkins v State, 632 So. 2d 555, 558 n.1 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992).
43. McGahee v State, 554 So. 2d 454, 459-62 (Ala. Crim. App.), aff'd, Ex parte
McGahee, 554 So. 2d 473 (Ala. 1989).
44. Freeman v State, CR 90-0279, slip op. at 3 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994).
45. Transcript of Postconviction Rec. at 39-56, Jefferson v State, CC-8-87 (Chambers
County Cir. Ct. Jan. 25, 1989), rev'd on other grounds, CR 92-0158 (Ala. Crim. App.
1994).
46. Transcript ofBatson Hearing at 106-07, Duncan v. State, CC-87-271 (Dallas County
Cir. Ct. July 31, 1991) (describing proportion of district attorney's strikes used against
African Americans in murder trials between 1981 and 1991).
Prosecutors' stereotypes about African Americans and fears about allowing them on
juries come into play even when the defendant is white. The same pattern of exclusion is
manifest in case after case regardless of the race of the accused. In 1991, the Supreme Court
held that Batson also applied in cases with nonminority defendants. Powers v Ohio, 499
U.S. 400, 402 (1991). The holding in Powers rested in part on the ground that race
discrimination harms the black jurors and the system as a whole as well as the accused.
520
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summoned from serving on its juries. In Talladega County, where Robert
Swain raised the issue thirty years ago, it still is routine to see prosecutors
using twelve of their fifteen challenges or nineteen of the twenty-two strikes
allotted them to remove black vemre members from the jury I
Even in the post-Batson era, prosecutors are excluding black jurors
with little resistance from the courts. If a defense attorney does not know
the protocol and fails to object to the practice, rarely will the trial judge note
the inequity on his own. (Indeed, Batson places the responsibility for ad-
dressing racial bias squarely on the shoulders of the defense and relieves
both the court and the state from any duty to eradicate racial bias.)48 If
counsel raises the issue of the state's lopsided strikes, she still may not
prevail in convincing the trial court that a prima facie case has been
established. In one recent case in Montgomery County, no prima facie case
was found despite the fact that the district attorney had used more than three-
fourths of her peremptory challenges against black jurors4 9 and that the
Alabama Supreme Court had censured the same district attorney for
continued Batson violations."0
The willingness of the courts to tolerate the sweeping exclusion of
minorities from jury service is seen best in the reasons deemed acceptable
to excuse the strikes, should the challenge get that far. In a 1986 case out
of Emanuel County, Georgia, the prosecutor used all ten of his peremptory
strikes to remove all ten African Americans from the venire.51 When
called upon to explain his reasons, he opined that he needed to strike one
venire member because he looked "dumb as a fencepost" and another
because he resembled the defendant.52 The judge accepted these as valid
47 Transcript of Batson Hearing at 37-38, Walker v State, CC-88-209, (Talladega
County Nov 13, 1991) (describing Watson and Calhoun cases, among others).
48. In fact, when defense counsel fails to object adequately to the state's discriminatory
conduct, the defendant will likely see the claim waived and will be precluded from litigating
it. See Lindsey v Smith, 820 F.2d 1137, 1142-45 (11th Cir. 1987); Morrison v State, 551
So. 2d 435, 437 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989). Michael Lindsey was executed in 1989 with a
defaulted jury challenge claim.
49 Harris v State, 632 So. 2d 503, 512-13 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992), aft'd, Ex parte
Harris, 632 So. 2d 543 (Ala. 1993).
50. ExparteBird, 594 So. 2d 676, 681 (Ala. 1991).
51. Gamble v State, 357 S.E.2d 792, 793 (Ga. 1987).
52. Id. at 795.
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reasons for removing the jurors, and the case proceeded to trial.53 Another
Georgia prosecutor maintained that he struck a black venire member because
she worked in a video store and therefore would not be "good with
people."4' The trial court found this excuse perfectly adequate, along with
the equally specious reasons offered for the eight other black people that the
district attorney had removed.55
Sometimes the state all but admits striking jurors on the basis of race,
and yet the reviewing courts ignore the obvious. One prosecutor gave as his
reason for several strikes that the potential jurors were affiliated with
Alabama State University-a predominantly black institution. This reason
was considered race neutral.56 Another capital conviction and death
sentence were affirmed when the prosecutor struck several jurors because
they lived in a "high-crime" neighborhood; she could not even come up with
a reason for her elimination of one black woman.' The appellate courts
were not perturbed when the state eliminated twelve of thirteen black jurors
in a 1986 Alabama case on the basis of unsubstantiated rumors about their
relatives provided by unknown third parties.5" Although the prosecutor
used twenty-one of his twenty-three strikes to remove black people from
Victor Stephens' jury, the courts upheld the specious reasons given and
refused to find a Batson violation.59
Quite often, the reasons are proved untrue, and the courts accept them
anyway At one Dallas County Batson hearing held in 1991-in which
twenty-three of twenty-eight strikes were used against African Ameri-
cans-the district attorney stated that he struck a Ms. Johnson because she
was related to various persons named Johnson whom he had previously
prosecuted. When given the opportunity on voir dire, he declined to ask the
venire member if she was indeed related to those who shared her common
53. Id. at 794.
54. Ford v State, 423 S.E.2d 245, 247 (Ga. 1992).
55. Id. at 246.
56. Scott v State, 599 So. 2d 1222, 1227-28 (Ala. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 599 So.
2d 1229 (Ala. 1992).
57 Exparte Bui, 627 So. 2d 855 (Ala. 1992).
58. State v Wilson, 571 So. 2d 1237, 1248-50 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989), rev'd on other
grounds, 571 So. 2d 1251 (Ala. 1990).
59. See Stephens v State, 580 So. 2d II, 15-21 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990), af'd, Ex
parte Stephens, 530 So. 2d 26 (Ala. 1991).
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surname. Ms. Johnson then took the stand to say that she had never heard
of these alleged relatives. Despite the fact that the asserted reason easily was
proved false, the trial court demed the challenge.' °
Precisely the same situation occurred in a Colbert County, Alabama
case in which the trial judge sustained reasons based on alleged relations that
did not actually exist.6 Ricky Adkins' Alabama conviction was affirmed
this year even though the prosecutor claimed to have struck a black juror
because he "thought" the juror was single when the juror had in fact stood
up in open court and plainly stated that he was married.62 Courts have
been so willing to bend over backwards to circumvent Batson that when a
prosecutor said he could not accept a black juror because he belonged to a
Masonic temple and Masons did not make good jurors, and the state later
acknowledged that the man was in fact a brick mason, the trial judge ignored
the discrepancy and found that there had been no discrimination in the
selection of the jury 63
No evidence of bias has been too blatant for state courts to ignore. A
trial court found no proof of racial taint when the prosecution eliminated
every black person from three different juries in a single case (one each to
determine competency, guilt, and punishment), even when it was disclosed
that the state had segregated the potential jurors into four lists denominated
"strong," "medium," "weak," and "black" prior to trial and had struck every
black individual in order from the list.64 Another judge refused to allow
the defense attorney to show that the reasons given for allegedly striking
venire members applied equally to the white jurors and were thus evidence
of pretext. 65 Courts have declined to take heed when issues that were
60. Transcript of Batson Hearing at 429-30, Duncan v State, CC-87-271 (Dallas
County Cir. Ct. July 31, 1991).
61. Guthrie v State, 598 So. 2d 1013, 1015, 1017 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991), cert.
denied, 598 So. 2d 1020 (Ala. 1992).
62. Adkins v State, No. 7 Div 146, 1993 WL 56209, at *5 (Ala. Crim. App. Mar.
5, 1993) (Bowen, J., dissenting), af4'd, Exparte Adkns, No. 1921371, 1994 WL 14018 (Ala.
Jan. 21, 1994).
63. Gamble v State, 357 S.E.2d 792, 796 (Ga. 1987).
64. TranscriptofPostconvictionRec. at39-56, Jeffersonv State, CC-8-77 (Chambers
County Cir. Ct. Jan. 25, 1989), rev'd on other grounds, CR 92-0158 (Ala. Crim. App.
1994).
65. Transcript of Batson Hearing at 38-40, Walker v State, CC-88-209 (Talladega
County Cir. Ct. Nov 13, 1991).
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singularly unimportant to inquire about on voir dire suddenly have great
weight when the state is asked to justify its strikes of black jurors.
These judges have often seen the same prosecutors practicing the same
exclusionary tactics for years. In some counties, all that has changed is that
defense attorneys now call upon prosecutors to justify their actions. The
prosecutors have learned to work within the new rules. By allowing a few
black people to sit on the jury and excluding the rest, they seek to avoid the
threshold determination of a prima facie showing and often succeed. By
finding out as much as they can about the black names on the venire list
prior to trial, they prepare themselves with after-the-fact reasons if called
upon to explain their strikes. One prosecutorial assistant acknowledged on
the stand that he was ordered to "dig up dirt" on the black venire members,
but never the white. 66 Some prosecutors rely on facts about the would-be
jurors ("single," "unemployed") that are accurate, but irrelevant to any
conceivable issue in the case.67 Time and again, the trial courts give the
seal of approval to manifestly fabricated explanations for the wholesale
exclusion of minorities from jury participation.
The Cost of Juror Exclusion
The judiciary's response to the problem of racially biased exclusion
of black venire members through peremptory strikes has been lethargic,
reluctant, and uninspired. The courts have revealed an indifference to racial
discrimination in jury selection that they do not tolerate in other areas. For
many racial minorities, it has become increasingly difficult to believe that the
criminal justice system works for people of color. In the deep South, black
people have marched, fought, and died for the right to vote, serve on juries,
and participate in making moral judgments for their communities. To be
casually excluded from meaningful participation after enormous struggle is
deeply discouraging and disheartening.
This is particularly true when the alchemy of race and crime has
generated a whole host of issues and tensions that intensify judgments about
66. See Parker v State, 610 So. 2d 1171, 1177 (Ala. Crim. App.), af'd, Exparte
Parker, 610 So. 2d 1181 (Ala. 1992).
67 See, e.g., Stephens v State, 580 So. 2d 11, 15, 19 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990), aff'd,
580 So. 2d 26 (Ala. 1991).
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crime and criminal justice.6" All elements of society pay a price for
tolerating exclusion. Not only is the integrity of the trial process greatly
undermined, but its accuracy and fairness are also compromised. Too often,
juries content themselves with deciding criminal cases based on unconfronted
racial stereotypes and presumptions about the guilt of some defen-
dants-notably young black men-and without the deliberative struggle that
is supposed to result in the truth. Systematic exclusion of black Americans
from the jury process allows such decisionmaking to go unchecked.
The problems that flow from unrepresentative juries and racially
discriminatiory selection procedures are serious and create significant
barriers to fair and just review of criminal cases. When courts accept vague
or pretextual explanations from prosecutors for peremptorily striking black
venire members and otherwise fail to confront biased jury selection, the
message that racially biased jury selection is an inevitable component of
American criminal trials is hard to miss.
The Need for Reorientation
Courts, legislators, and decisionmakers within the criminal justice
system make a serious mistake when they evaluate issues of racial bias solely
in terms of prejudice to individual defendants. Black citizens unfairly
excluded from jury service and others affected by criminal case determina-
tions are alienated by the tolerance of racially discriminatory legal practices.
As the review of peremptories and racial bias in jury selection illustrates,
criminal defendants and the society as a whole are affected by the indiffer-
ence to racial bias in criminal proceedings. It is significant that in the last
quarter-century, America's most devastating domestic civil disturbances have
been ignited by perceptions that the criminal justice system operates in a
racially discriminatory manner.
Riots in Los Angeles, Miami, and Detroit, along with similar
expressions of frustration and anger over the apparent tolerance of racial
bias, reveal the importance of confronting any perception that racism in the
administration of criminal justice is inevitable. While a host of socioeco-
nomic factors underlies recent race riots and civil disturbances, these events
clearly reflect a profound absence of hope in systems of justice and a belief
68. A USA Today poll revealed that many white Americans are much more willing
than nonwhites to presume that prosecutors and police officers are telling the truth in a
criminal case and much less likely to regard a claim of racial bias seriously 'Gulf' Separates
Races in Dealings With Police, USA TODAY, Feb. I1, 1993, at 1IA.
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that the promise of equality and fairness for people of color is meaningless.
In addressing the needs of the urban poor and many African Americans,
contemporary philosophers have begun to recognize that confronting
hopelessness and despair is as important as constructing specific remedies for
perceived problems.69
A similar reorientation in the psyche of the justice system's key
players is necessary to confront racial bias. Legal doctrines that accept the
inevitability of racially tainted jury selection or sentencing have no place in
a reoriented commitment to eliminate discrimnation. In 1954, the Supreme
Court could have declared racially segregated school systems that deny
minority children equal educational opportunity the unavoidable result of a
racially divided society However, in Brown v Board of Education,' the
Court insisted on change. Unlike the cynicism and indifference that has
characterized the Court's treatment of race bias claims in the criminal justice
context, Brown reflected a vision of justice that differed greatly from what
had previously been accepted as an inevitable and permanent feature of
American education.
A similar conversion and a new vision of justice is essential to
effective confrontation of racial bias in the criminal justice system.
Eliminating the exclusion of people of color from jury service through
peremptory strikes is a perfect place to start. The Court must reject its
approach of cautious adjustment and reinvigorate its efforts to prevent the
removal of even a single juror because of race.
69 See generally CORNELL WEST, RACE MATTERS (1993). Cornell West describes
the "nihilism that increasingly pervades black communities." Id. at 14. He states that
"nihilism is to be understood here not as a philosophic doctrine that there are no rational
grounds for legitimate standards or authority; it is, far more, the lived experience of coping
with hopelessness." Id. (emphasis omitted). This problem is not unrelated to the
abdication of justice revealed by the Court's "inevitability" doctrine in McCleskey and the
cynicism behind many courts' treatment of racially biased use of peremptory strikes. Like
the nihilistic threat West attempts to identify and challenge, the tolerance of bias in criminal
justice must be confronted not simply with knowledge and mechanisms for reform, but also
with conviction.
Like alcoholism and drug addiction, nihilism is a disease of the soul. It can
never be completely cured, and there is always the possibility of relapse. But
there is always a chance for conversion-a chance for people to believe that
there- is hope for the future and a meaning to struggle.
Id. at 18.
70. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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The legal community already possesses a tremendous amount of
knowledge about the problems of racial bias in the administration of criminal
justice, as well as many thoughtful proposed solutions. However, given the
history of bias and exclusion that pervades criminal justice issues, it is
abundantly clear that ideas and proposals will never be enough without some
accompanying conviction and commitment. No matter what inventive and
thoughtful strategies emerge in the next decade to reduce the appalling and
debilitating presence of racial bias in America's criminal justice system,
there must first be a recommitment to a new vision of justice. Any legal
construct that determines that racial bias in the administration of criminal
justice is "inevitable" must clearly be rejected. It is not only realistic to
expect this society to eliminate racial bias in its justice system, but it is also
necessary and essential to the moral authority of the law and the courts that
such an expectation be articulated and enthusiastically pursued.

